



































In the recent excitement about the democratising potential of the ‘new’ electronic 
media, theorists have largely ignored the role of the oldest of the electronic ‘mass’ 
media, that is, radio.  This paper suggests several parallels between the oldest and the 
newest electronic media in the transmission of anti-authoritarian politics in Indonesia.  
While the Internet aided sections of the civil society in subverting the state’s control 
over public discourse, in the post-authoritarian politics, radio may remain by far the 
more significant technology of democratisation.  Radio’s importance is only in part 
explained by the economic limits on the distribution of the Internet in Indonesia.  We 
need to look at the particular tessellation of culture, politics and technology in 
Indonesia to understand the role of radio in the articulation of local politics, in a 
democratisation process whose success depends on the politics of ethno-cultural 
decentralisation and devolution of power from urban elites. 
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This paper arises out of a reaction against the techno-triumphalism of the vast 
majority of writing about the Internet. But the paper is about a much older medium – 
the radio. And while it is embedded in the perennial questions of media studies (at 
least post-McLuhan) about the relationship between media technology and social 
exchange, this is a largely empirical account of one medium in one national context. I 
suggest that in the context of democratisation in Indonesia, radio has played and 
continues to play a role that the Internet cannot replicate – most importantly because 
of the socio-historical specificities of radio in Indonesia.  
In terms of its broad analytical underpinnings, the paper draws on and talks to 
two quite different bodies of academic work:  (i) theories of the relationship between 
electronic media and democracy; and (ii) area-studies analyses of the process of 
democratisation in Indonesia 
i) Electronic Media and Democracy  
In contrast to the meagre theoretical literature on radio (Miller, 1992) the Internet has 
taken the academic imagination by storm, dominated in particular by the utopian 
vision of ‘virtual democracy’.1  In Indonesia, the excitement about the democratic 
promise of the Internet preceded the actual arrival of the technology in Indonesia. 
(Sen and Hill 2000:194-202) 
How far this ‘cyber democracy’ remains ‘politics in a parallel universe’ (to 
borrow a phrase from Ogden 1994) and how and to what extent virtual democracy of 
on-line activity is related to the ‘material’ one of the street and the ballot box is a 
common line of enquiry. When the so-called anti-globalisation movement can use the 
Internet to call thousands of young protesters out to the streets of Seattle (November 
1999) or Melbourne (September 2001), the lines between virtual and real politics 
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seem to disappear altogether. In Indonesia, similarly, on the eve of the historic 1999 
elections, Onno Purbo, US-trained engineering lecturer at Indonesia’s premier 
Institute of Technology in Bandung and a self-proclaimed Net-Activist, called on the 
rebellious students to stay home and convey their feeling to the Parliamentarians on-
line instead of marching out on the streets and confronting the army. Such elision 
between actions in cyberspace and in the material world is quite common to models of 
cyber democracy.  
Yet there are no clear analyses as to the extent to which such global and 
national mobilisations draw on existing social networks, where the Internet is little 
more than a convenient tool. Globally coordinated movements of protest predate the 
Internet after all. In another generation the fax and the telephone seemed to be 
similarly effective weapons of war for middle class activists around the globe. Morris-
Suzuki and Rimmer (2002) putting the current global protest movements in context, 
write of the ways in which the massive Japanese anti-Vietnam war protests used 
traditional broadcast and narrowcast media to organise nationally. ‘International 
collaboration, meanwhile, was made possible by relatively cheap intercontinental 
airfares and airmail and, in particular, by increasing access to the international 
telephone network’ (7). The movement’s leader, Oda Makoto wondered then at the 
power of international phone calls: ‘With just one phone call it is possible to conduct 
and coordinate action in many parts of the world. It seems that the various progressive 
groups of the world have not yet noticed this fact.’ (Oda 1974, in Morris-Suzuki & 
Rimmer 2002:7) 
In some ways, there is little new in the optimism that the Internet and the 
world wide web will set us free from the control of states and of multinational 
corporations and promote communication across all social and political boundaries. 
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As McChesney points out ‘every major new electronic media technology this century, 
from film, AM radio, short-wave radio, and facsimile broadcasting to FM radio, 
terrestrial television broadcasting, cable TV, and satellite broadcasting, has spawned 
similar utopian notions. In each case, to varying degrees, visionaries have told us how 
these new magical technologies would crush the existing monopolies over media, 
culture, and knowledge and open the way for a more egalitarian and just social order’ 
(McChesney, c1999: 119-120).  Countering optimism, more and more research is 
drawing attention to online inequities, both between and within nation states. This is 
not just a matter of access but also a matter of capacity to use the access effectively. 
Summarising this body of work Anthony Wilhelm concludes: ‘These observations are 
significant in underscoring a central dynamic of emerging communications networks, 
that some scholars choose to ignore, namely its complicity with and even 
subordination to accumulated economic and media powers’. (2000:39) 
Crucially, however, the overwhelming majority of writers about the Internet 
return repeatedly to the Internet’s capacity for interactivity, which distinguishes it 
from the broadcast media, radio and television. While the bad old media delivered to 
government and to business access to mass citizenry, the new interactive media 
delivers to all citizens the power of public speech. It is this generalised distinction 
between broadcast radio and interactive Internet that I want to question in the 
particular context of New Order and post-New Order Indonesia. I will argue that the 
observable record (to borrow a phrase from McChesney) of the oldest electronic 
media in Indonesia in comparison with the newest suggests that radio, over a long 
period of Indonesian history, has continued to breach both state censorship and 
corporate monopoly control and operated as a vector for public discourse and indeed 
that radio has provided a degree of ‘interactivity’ – one that we might call a socially 
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produced interactivity in contrast to the technologically given one of the Internet. This 
paper, then, pre-empts (and questions) some of the grounds for the current 
valorisation of the Internet’s unique capacity to create a discursive (interactive) 
political space for civil society. 
This is not an entirely new line of enquiry. Potts (1989 in Miller 1992), writing 
on radio in Australia argues that radio both ‘speaks to the public’ and ‘lets the public 
speak’ (6). In his discussion of talkback David Row (1992 following Crisell, 1986) 
suggests: ‘The dyadic and triadic permutations of broadcaster/listener, 
broadcaster/caller, caller/listener and broadcaster/caller/listener, at once individual 
and collective and private/public, introduce both elements of voyeurism and activism 
to radio broadcasts’ (16). My argument in this essay extends beyond talkback, 
however, and I will return later to a more situated discussion of radio interactivity that 
is being flagged here.  
ii) End of the New Order in Indonesia 
While there is widespread agreement that Suharto’s power structure imploded from 
within (See Schwarz, 1999: chapter 11), to many who observed the dramatic end of 
the New Order, urban student rebels and professionals in the media, acting on behalf 
of discontented middle classes, seemed to be the heroes. But not for long. Within 
months the anticipation of a strong civil society, led by a civic spirited middle class, 
was dashed by spiralling ethnic and religious conflicts. John Sidel suggests that there 
may be serious limitations to the role of the middle class intelligentsia with its faith in 
liberal democracy, civic spiritedness, and tolerance ‘against a backdrop of 
dangerously illiberal, uncivil, and sectarian mass politics’ (Sidel 2001: 114) which has 
followed the fall of Suharto.  
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This gap between a mass-based democracy and the democratic ideals of the 
intelligentsia has a long history in Indonesia. In 1973, Liddle, writing of the urban 
middle class ‘secular modernising intellectuals’ in the transition from Sukarno to 
Soeharto, noted their fear of and ignorance about ‘the masses’ (Liddle 1973: 200). 
Two elements common to the intelligentsia (cutting across a variety of differences) 
identified in Liddle’s account are worth recalling here: first, their sustained critique of 
mass-based party politics (pp. 182–7); and second, their conviction of ‘the centrality 
of their own role’ (p. 186). The convictions of the intellectual political actors could 
only have been reinforced in the three decades of Soeharto’s Indonesia. New Order 
repression made any sort of mass politics impossible, and democratic ideals could 
only be developed and nurtured as an intellectual project in the relative security of 
university classrooms, small magazines, and later on the Internet.  
John Sidel, a foreign observer of Indonesia and Indonesian social scientist 
Ignas Kleden have mobilised Habermas’ notion of deliberative democracy – in 
somewhat different ways – to understand the nature of this politics of debate and 
discussion in Indonesia. If Sidel underscores the limitations of ‘Habermasian 
discussions and debates on the seminar circuits and newspaper editorial pages of 
Jakarta’ (2001: 114), then Kleden’s conclusion that the current politics of Indonesia 
defies the Habermasian model is an instance precisely of the Indonesian intellectuals’ 
rueful admission of the failure of their deliberative democracy. It is easy to see why 
the Internet would have been embraced by students and their wider support base, the 
urban professionals and intellectuals, against Suharto and his army, as the preferred 
weapon in a battle for the primacy of the deliberative/discursive modes over other 
modes of acquiring and exercising power. The ways in which critics of the Suharto 
regime used the Internet to defy government censorship is discussed elsewhere (Hill 
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and Sen, 2000). But if the civilised intellectual ideals of deliberative democracy 
contained in the reformasi movement of the 1990s are not easily reconcilable with the 
practices of a mass-based electoral politics of the street and even the parliament, 
which has followed the fall of Suharto, then do we need to ask also if their medium of 
defiance and deliberation, the Internet, is necessarily the medium of mass based 
democracy? 
Prominent theorist of communication Neil Postman has suggested that in order 
to evaluate the social implications of a technology we need to ask ‘what is a problem 
to which this is a solution’? (cited in Graham 1999:4) When such a question is raised 
about the Internet in the particular historical context of the last years of Suharto’s 
reign, the answer is reasonably clear. For all practical purposes the Internet arrived in 
Indonesia in the mid-1990s, when intellectual dissent against the regime’s censorship 
practices was already high. Although connectivity was very low (about 0.1% of the 
total population) even after taking account of public access points, the Internet 
allowed radical journalists to develop alternative networks of news, bypassing the 
censored media; it allowed human rights activists to be in contact with the outside 
world more cheaply and more easily than any previous mode of communication. But 
in post-Suharto Indonesia, with state censorship in tatters, what is the political 
problem to which the Internet is a solution?  
Political parties which emerged within the formal electoral structure in 
Indonesia after Suharto did not embrace the Internet as their tool. In 1999 only nine of 
the 48 parties contesting Indonesia’s first free and fair election in decades had their 
own website, and there appears to be no relation whatsoever between the use of the 
Net and electoral success. (Hill and Sen 2000: 131) But beyond formal electoral 
politics, democratisation (more than simply the fall of an authoritarian regime) is 
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often linked to the rise of the civil society as a third public sphere, autonomous of the 
market and more importantly of the state. In Indonesia, as elsewhere in Asia, the term 
civil/civic society is coming into increasing play in the discourses about 
democratisation, in particular via the language of international NGOs investing in 
‘civil society’ programs.  
This paper turns to the history of radio in Indonesia in order to understand the 
kind of discursive space radio can provide for the civil society, in particular in 
comparison to the Internet. In other words, I am concerned here not with the formal 
political organisation of parties and legislatures but with the role that radio has played 
in the diverse constellations of public (many to many) communication of citizens, and 
to make a judgement of the role that it might continue to play in Indonesia in the 
digital age. This is not a general argument about the nature of these technologies. 
Elsewhere in Asia, radio has been fully harnessed to the state’s ideological purposes. 
In India, for instance, even after deregulation of the television industry in the 1990s, 
the national government had monopoly over the massive network of radio stations 
until 2001. In the last year or so however 150 FM stations in 40 cities have been 
licensed, some with foreign ownership, and restricted to deliver entertainment only.2 
In Thailand, in a partially deregulated media market, radio remains largely under the 
control of various military factions.3 Clearly, in these circumstances radio cannot 
have the capacities which I am claiming for it in the Indonesian context. Indeed, this 
paper is grounded in the conviction that there can be no universal reading of the 
political consequences of any electronic medium and that their implications must be 
understood in the tessellations of technology, culture and politics in particular 
historical and temporal contexts.  
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Radio at the End of the New Order 
Like many newly independent nations of Asia, the post-colonial Indonesian state had 
monopoly control over radio. But by the early 1960s, this control was eroded in a 
number of ways. Hundreds of illegal student radio stations emerged, broadcasting in a 
tiny range (sometimes little more than a handful of individuals operating from a 
private residence) but in direct competition to the national broadcaster, Radio 
Republik Indonesia (RRI). Some of these became more directly politicised after the 
incidents of 1 October 19654 and were staffed round-the-clock by bands of student 
activists opposed to President Sukarno. One of the best known of these, Radio 
Ampera, set up by activists including brothers Soe Hok Gie and Arief Budiman, 
broadcast for a time from the home of Mashuri, then a next-door neighbour and 
trusted political ally of Suharto.5 While technically illegal, anti-communist and anti-
Sukarno broadcasts were not just condoned but often actively aided by ascendant 
factions of the military. While based at Mashuri’s residence Radio Ampera, for 
instance, was openly protected by pro-Suharto troops.  
Despite low transmission power and very limited audience reach, the existence 
of ‘hundreds of “unofficial” stations ... on the air in the vicinity of the capital alone’ 
(McDaniel 1994:223) effectively broke RRI’s monopoly control over broadcasted 
information and interpretation of the fluid politics of the time. Radio Ampera, for 
example, chose to broadcast its leading news commentaries at 7 pm, precisely the 
time of the RRI evening news, thereby forcing listeners to choose. The student 
stations also flaunted RRI’s ban on certain types of Western pop music, by 
broadcasting popular songs from prohibited bands like the Beatles and Rolling Stones. 
The strategy drew young listeners to the fledgling non-government radio in droves. 
RRI never regained its monopoly of the airwaves. 
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From the point of view of the new New Order state in 1965, radio had been re-
invented – it was no longer the powerful medium of state propaganda under 
government control. It was a fractured medium, in the hands of small, localised 
groups, with small and diversified audiences. Three new categories of radio were 
legalised in 1970: commercial, community and local government – but the lines 
between them were never particularly clear.  
The New Order state attempted to control this reinvented radio by three main 
means: licensing, restricting political content, and ‘localisation’ by which I mean 
forcing a particular definition on radio as ‘local’ and ‘cultural’ as opposed to RRI 
which was ‘national’ and ‘political’. 
Licensing: On the whole, unlike television, commercial radio licences were 
issued without centralised political interventions. In the 1990s there were over 700 
registered non-RRI radio stations – and an unaccounted for number of non-registered 
ones. The government periodically carried out blitz or ‘sweeping’ (as it is known in 
Indonesia) to close down illegal operations – the large numbers of illegals picked up 
in these ‘sweeps’ suggests a complete failure by the Indonesian state to restrict the 
establishment of radio stations, particularly in regions with high degrees of discontent 
with the New Order state. (In Aceh, in 1996, for instance, thirty-six of the seventy 
private stations were found to be running with no permit and closed down.6) 
Radio was a successful medium in some sense, as the large numbers of legal 
and illegal stations suggest, but not in the sense of large commercial profit-generating 
success. Many local governments and military commanders maintained and supported 
one or another radio station. But unlike television, or the film industry or even the 
press, radio never became the target of large corporate commercial interests. In 1987 
the Director General of Radio, Television and Film specifically ruled out non-
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government radio stations from opening ‘branches or agencies, whether using the 
same company name or a different company name’. In addition, he ruled that ‘bodies 
operating non-government radio stations are not permitted to engage in other types of 
businesses apart from activities linked to the social function of radio broadcast 
itself’.7
Since the late 1980s Suharto family and friends had come to acquire an 
unprecedented financial control over print and audio-visual media. In the late 1970s, 
another member of the family, Sudwikatmono, had gained monopoly control of film 
import and distribution. While in the 1990s both Bambang and Tutut, the main media 
players amongst the Suharto children, started to acquire radio stations, their holdings 
(about half-a-dozen between them) remained small in an industry where other 
considerations (which become obvious in the following discussion) had produced a 
policy that worked against monopoly, corporate control.  
De-politicisation: As indicated earlier, politics was the raison d’etre for the illegal 
radio sector at the beginning of the New Order. The government moved quickly to 
depoliticise it. Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) No. 55 on Non-Government Radio 
Broadcasting, which provided the framework for the New Order’s radio policy stated 
that programs were ‘not to be used ... for political activities’. The ban on political 
activities had three practical elements:  
i) Private radio stations were barred from producing news and were obliged 
to relay the news broadcasts of RRI, the national government radio – 
initially the precise requirements were unclear, but later fixed at 14 times a 
day.  
ii) There were to be no relays of foreign broadcasts.  
iii) Stations were required to maintain recordings of all broadcasts. 
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The ephemeral nature of its broadcast, however, makes it notoriously difficult to 
monitor the programming content on radio. Live programs are almost impossible to 
censor. There were various regulations designed to prevent live broadcasts including a 
requirement that radio stations keep copies of all broadcasted material and not 
broadcast from outside the studio. However, the state had no capacity (and as later 
discussion will show, often no inclination) to monitor any of this, as hundreds of radio 
stations mushroomed around the nation, with many of them broadcasting 24 hours a 
day. In Yogyakarta in 1996, for example, the Department of Information section 
charged with monitoring local radio programs reportedly had only a single radio 
receiver to follow fifteen private stations in the city and did no more than check on the 
compulsory news relay from RRI.  
Station owners and executives sought repeatedly to change the requirement to 
relay RRI news broadcast, not because of any critical political intent, but due to the 
widespread belief that audiences tended to turn radio off at times of such relay. Most 
private stations continued to employ staff with responsibility for covering 'current 
information' (informasi aktual), that is, in any other language, 'news' stories. Even 
senior government bureaucrats recognised that, in radio, ‘although normatively there 
are limits, ... in fact they [radio stations] have extraordinary freedom’.8  For stations 
in the outlying districts of the nation, the ability to broadcast up-to-date news in 
advance of the newspapers is seen as radio’s leading edge. Even in towns which have 
their own dailies, national news (by definition news printed in Jakarta papers) is on 
the local radio before the newspapers from Jakarta arrive in subscribers' hands, often a 
full day after printing in the capital, and then only provided there had been no flight 
delays.9  
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In recognition of the appeal of news, the majority of Indonesian stations 
incorporated various kinds of ‘discussion’, ‘information’ or talk-back format 
programs dealing with recent political issues. Even Jakarta’s Trijaya FM, owned by 
Suharto’s son Bambang Trihatmodjo seemed to be constantly pushing the limits of 
censorship with its weekly ‘Jakarta First Channel’ program discussing controversial 
political issues, while being protected by the assumed immunity of its owner. 
Bandung’s Radio Mara Ghita ignored perhaps the majority of broadcast regulations 
when it relayed various foreign transmissions for a period of days leading up to the 
fall of President Marcos in Philippines. In the last months of the New Order the ban 
on news and on outside of studio broadcast were flouted openly. On 27 July 1996, 
Radio Ramako broadcast on the spot reports of escalating violence triggered by the 
attack on the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, led by Megawati, now President) 
headquarters, with its star presenter reporting ‘live to air’ via her mobile phone. This 
kind of live reporting from political rallies and riots became common practice for 
many stations in the final days of Suharto’s rule. As at the beginning of the New 
Order, so at the end, the lines between political reporting on radio and political action 
were largely erased. 
It was the New Order’s practice to remind radio owners of the restriction on 
news whenever there were major controversial political events. There were stern 
reminders from the authorities soon after the 27 July 1996 riots in Jakarta. While 
overt discussions of the riots and their causes did cease briefly after the government’s 
warning, most stations continued to report, through indirect references, on local 
repercussions of the events in Jakarta, by various means. For instance, UNISI radio, 
known for its appeal to university students, continued to provide advance notice of 
student demonstrations in the city under the guise of information about road closures 
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in its ‘traffic’ bulletins! Radio stations around the country, particularly with large 
student followings, used their broadcast not only to report the rapidly unfolding 
political saga, but also to provide various kinds of support for the demonstrators, in 
particular to announce impending gatherings of students.  
Through most of New Order period, the Department of Information only 
intervened forcefully if a station’s programming sparked some attention in the print 
media. In February 1995 Radio UNISI broadcast an interview with controversial 
psychic Permadi, concerning among other things, his predictions on one of the hottest 
topics of that time, the presidential succession. The interview sparked no immediate 
attention, but a recording of it together with a seminar given by Permadi at Yogya’s 
premier Gajah Mada University, began circulating from hand to hand particularly 
amongst students. Two weeks after the broadcast, the interview was mentioned in 
Yogya’s Bernas and Surabaya’s Jawa Pos dailies. The Yogya city office of the 
Department of Information responded immediately to the press report, writing to 
UNISI management requesting a copy of the interview. The following week, the head 
of the regional office (kantor wilayah) of the Department, also wrote to UNISI 
claiming the broadcast ‘had a broad impact and had been quite unsettling to all 
parties’ and declared the station had broadcast ‘”political news” contravening 
regulations’, which he then listed. He accused UNISI, in New Order-speak, of 
‘broadcasting information in a sensational tone, which could disturb National Security 
and give rise to unhealthy community opinions and [which] could unsettle the 
community.’ The letter instructed UNISI to cease their ‘”City Info” program on which 
the interview had been broadcast, as it was identical to “Straight News”’ [English in 
the original]. He then wrote to all non-government Yogyakarta stations condemning 
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recent ‘deviations’ from government regulations, instructing them to ‘eliminate 
broadcasts which were vulgar, and with unclear motivations and direction’.10  
The effect of these events was quite positive for UNISI, strengthening the 
station’s reputation in the city as critical, 'stirring' (mbalelo) and informative.11 A year 
later UNISI again breached the limits of censorship by broadcasting two extracts of a 
six-part interview with Sri Bintang Pamungkas, head of the unauthorised Indonesian 
Democratic Union Party (Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia, PUDI) but canned the 
remainder of the series after a telephone warning from the Department of Information. 
(Article XIX 1996:13) 
Localisation: In Indonesian terminology the New Order had started with a 
‘wild’ radio industry (industri liar12). Licensing was one mode of bringing it under 
state control, but as the continuation of  ‘liar’/unlicensed stations mentioned above 
shows, the New Order’s capacity to control the establishment of radio stations was 
limited. The government moved to protect the state’s monopoly over national 
broadcast, legislating to define non-government radio as a medium of ‘local’ 
‘cultural’ communication. A 1971 Directive of the Communication Minister devolved 
the authority over non-government stations to the provincial governor and the local 
military command KOPKAMTIB. A Directive of the Minister of Information in the 
same year emphasised the local moorings of radio, stating that ‘a broadcast is local, 
not national, in character’, and that the ‘nature, content and purpose of a broadcast 
reflects the local relationship with the conditions and growth of the area reached by 
the broadcast’.13 After 1982 shortwave broadcast by private radio was phased out. 
Stations opted increasingly for the AM and, from 1987, FM bands, with clearer 
transmission over shorter distances.14 Government regulation stipulated maximum 
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transmitter power, which limited the broadcast area to about 100 kilometres for FM 
and approximately 300-400 kilometres for AM stations. (Lindsay 1997:114)15  
Implementation of government policy was the responsibility of the Regional 
Authority for the Development of Non-Government Radio (Badan Pembina Radio 
Siaran Non Pemerintah di Daerah, BPRSNPD, henceforth Regional Radio Authority) 
appointed by the Governor, and consisting of provincial bureaucrats. In 1978 this 
Regional Radio Authority was given wide-ranging powers to take ‘preventive’ and 
‘punitive’ actions, including the withdrawal of permits and the closing down of non-
government stations. The Regional Radio Authority was also responsible for vetting 
any ‘broadcast material, which originated from abroad’. While private stations were 
obliged to relay news and other (unspecified) government broadcasts from RRI 
Jakarta, the local body determined precisely which materials were ‘obligatory relay’ 
(wajib relay) from RRI ‘according to the interests of the region concerned’.16 A slew 
of memos and regulations from Ministers and senior bureaucrats emphasised that non-
government stations should give priority to programs ‘whose materials are drawn 
from local regional cultures’ and ‘whose broadcast materials originate domestically 
and are appropriate to local conditions’.17 In the 1990s some of the control over 
implementation of policy reverted to the cental government but radio remained, both 
in practice and in government policy, a much more ‘local’ medium than either film or 
television. The Broadcast Bill enacted in 1997, while noting the different spans of 
broadcast (local, provincial, regional, national) permissible for private television, 
reiterated that radio broadcast is always restricted to the area in the vicinity of the 
station. 
This policy of ‘localisation’ had two interesting consequences: (i) it kept the 
commercial potential of radio relatively low and radio therefore remained in the hands 
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of small business and, in some instances, community groups and NGOs; and (ii) it 
embedded radio in local communities, tied to the needs and desires of its small, often 
linguistically and culturally differentiated, listening publics. In rural areas in particular 
the most popular radio shows tended to be traditional forms of oral entertainment, 
‘tailored to the local cultural tastes of each region’. (Astrid Susanto, 1978:237) As 
Jennifer Lindsay illustrates in her detailed study of radio and local identity in 
Indonesia, the ‘persistent survival of private radio... indicates the vitality of the 
Indonesian tradition of local community expression through radio broadcasting’. 
(Lindsay 1997:115)18 Popular stations, she argues, do not simply broadcast to a given 
geographical area; they attempt to create and maintain audience loyalty by 
manufacturing a communal identity and continually refining ‘their own interpretations 
of what is “local”.’ (116)  In contrast to film and television, where New Order policy 
virtually banned use of vernaculars, radio broadcasts used local languages extensively 
in all genres of programming. 
The degree of specialised and localised service provided by private radio is 
exemplified in the tiny Radio Terunajaya in Pameungpeuk, Garut district, the sole 
radio station for four rural districts scattered along a thirty kilometre span of the 
southern coast of West Java. Located in a hilly region, with poor communication and 
transportation, far from asphalt roads, the station’s special appeal is its broadcast of 
individual and community announcements. Villagers use the station to transmit urgent 
messages from one village to another in the secure knowledge that, with little 
alternative entertainment, someone in the target village is likely to be listening and 
able to pass on the message. Amongst its other regular broadcasts are Sundanese 
folktales and other fiction, and Indonesian and Sundanese pop music. Despite its 
small size, Terunajaya’s more or less captive market of 140 000 enables the station to 
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survive commercially. Set up in 1991 with capital of Rp 100 million, it broke even 
after two years on the strength of its niche market and strong community 
identification.19  
Terunajaya is one instance of what I would call the ‘socially produced 
interactivity’ of radio. In terms of creating a capacity for political communication for 
civil society, this social production of interactivity is as important as the 
technologically given interactivity of the Internet. Nor is this socially produced 
interactivity a phenomenon peculiar to this small isolated and rather odd little radio 
station. In Bandung, arguably the cradle of the Indonesian brand of cyber democracy, 
radio Mara promoted itself as the ‘barometer of the dynamics of the population of 
Bandung’. The comment had initially come to the station’s director from a regional 
military commander, as an explanation of why they tolerated Mara’s hallmark talk-
back shows, when these were in fact illegal! Mara, the commander had said, was the 
local military’s regular source for understanding depths of local sensitivities over 
particular issues. Confirmed in the precise role in which the station wished to cast 
itself, as the voice of the local population, Mara later adopted the army commander’s 
statement as part of its station profile. On the eve of Suharto’s resignation, Mara 
announcers and newsreaders called on their listeners to peacefully demonstrate their 
opposition to Suharto by wearing a white ribbon. From then till Suharto’s resignation, 
the station was inundated with phone-calls of support and supplies of white ribbon. A 
local businessman, reading this call from the radio station as a sign of support for the 
demonstrating students, contacted the radio station and, through it, became involved 
in supplying food and drinks to the demonstrating students. 
Of course, the Internet newsgroups around the country were performing similar 
networking functions. But three important points emerge from the foregoing: 
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i) In the context of New Order policy and politics radio has developed a 
capacity for interactivity. At the end of the New Order radio was not, and 
was not seen as, a tool of one-way communication with a mass audience. It 
was a medium where the audiences could and did speak back in a variety 
of ways – thus eroding the conventional distinction between the producer 
and the consumer in mass communication. It was a sphere where 
individuals and groups could anonymously and publicly express their ideas 
– it was in fact a perfect instance of a Habermassian public-sphere outside 
state and corporate control.  
ii) Importantly, the public from the point of view of radio was potentially 
synonymous with almost the entire citizenry, in stark contrast to the 
minute reach of the Internet, restricted to a microscopic elite with the 
required literacy and economic capability.  
iii) Social interactivity of radio was clearly geographically restricted to a very 
localised community – within the zone of broadcast into which each 
station was restricted. And even within that each radio station has only 
small sections of a segmented market. But it is this limitation which then 
turns the radio into a representational tool – a local coffee shop (to follow 
Habermass’ analogy for public sphere), a town hall where the local 
community can exchange, formulate and express ideas, and ultimately take 
that local position to the national arena.  
Mediating a new Democracy 
On 5 June 1998, barely a week after the resignation of Suharto,Yunus Yosfiah, the 
new Minister of Information in the first post-Suharto government, removed all 
restrictions on private stations’ producing their own news. In the chaotic explosion of 
 20
all media in the post-Suharto period, dozens if not hundreds of new stations have 
emerged since 1998. The website of the Private Radio Owners’ Association, PRSSNI 
lists 780 member stations – but as membership of the association is no longer 
compulsory, this is clearly an incomplete list. A number of radio stations are now 
entirely dedicated to news and current affairs. A variety of national, local and 
international NGOs have become actively involved in either establishing new stations 
or linking up to existing ones. Two of the largest new radio networks belong to 
NGOs, and both are heavily supported by international donor agencies. Asia 
Foundation’s largest single grant in Indonesia (up to 2001) was to a national network 
of radio stations led by Radio 78 H, with strong connections to the journalists and 
students who had been in the front-line of anti-New Order activism since the mid-
1990s. Similarly the most visible aspect of the US-based Internews is its support for 
radio stations across the Indonesian archipelago – particularly notable as the 
organisation works primarily with the print media in many other newly democratising 
nations where it is active.  
There is a great deal of overlap between sections of the population which self-
consciously utilised the radio and those that used the Internet as vectors of political 
communication during the New Order. The urban students had been in the vanguard 
in establishing illegal radio in the mid-60s. In the 1990s the succeeding generation 
embraced the Internet, but they did so without giving up the radio. University students 
manned many of the illegal news and current affair programs of radio stations 
throughout the New Order period. Radio stations whose workers and audience were 
students and young professionals started to go on-line, as the new technology became 
available after 1996. Needless to say that the technological lines between the two 
media are fast disappearing everywhere. Radio stations in big cities are using the 
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Internet to broadcast on line, to advertise and to extend total quantity of broadcast 
material. In a context where all media seems to be converging into a new digital 
multi-media technology, the kind of concern about the specificity of radio in a 
particular nation, which is driving this essay, may well become out-dated. 
Nonetheless, my focus here on the specificities of radio as an institutional and 
technological practice raises a cautionary note about convergence. 
It is clear from foregoing discussion that in New Order Indonesia radio was 
able to flout state controls and to provide a space for political discourse for sections of 
the society. The corollary to this is perhaps obvious: that even if we defined the 
problem of democratisation in Indonesia narrowly as the need to bypass state 
censorship, the Internet was neither absolutely essential nor the only tool of 
communication which answered this problem. Indeed, the ephemeral nature of radio 
broadcast, which makes it particularly difficult to investigate and hold to account 
those who produce and sanction what goes on air, made radio an excellent 
technological solution to the problem of censorship. Broadcasts just disappear into 
thin air; they leave behind no digital footprints, unless of course radio is linked into a 
digital platform. In that sense the digitisation of radio may well render it a less 
effective weapon against certain kinds of repressive regimes. 
Democratisation however is not ensured simply by the fall of a repressive 
regime such as the New Order. The question with which this essay started was about 
the capacities of the media to underpin the formation of a strong civil society, 
necessarily fractured in itself but autonomous from both the market and from the 
state. And here issues of access are of vital importance. Through the period of the 
New Order, the level of ownership of radio sets had soared along with the expansion 
in the market for consumer goods generally, as Indonesia recovered rapidly from the 
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economic downturn of the 1960s. Between 1970 and 1980 the number of sets in use 
increased more than six-fold. In 1970, there were 2.5 million sets in use, in 1980 there 
were fifteen million and by 1994, 28.8 million.20 More than 3.1 million portable 
radios were sold in 1995 alone, making Indonesia one of the largest markets for these 
products in the world.21 Ownership rates per head of population are lower in 
Indonesia’s rural areas, but at least in Java most households now own a radio. 
Ethnographic accounts of Javanese villages suggest that radio ownership in rural areas 
remains far higher than television ownership, or subscription rates for print media and 
that radio is the primary mass medium for much of rural Indonesia.22 The contrast 
with the tiny reach of Internet, restricted to the cities, to the literate and the young is 
obvious. Indeed, in comparison to all other media in Indonesia, access of citizens to 
radio, both as producers and consumers, is less marked by indices of social hierarchy 
such as money, literacy and proximity to Jakarta.  
Another related point of difference between the Internet and radio is important 
if decentralisation of culture and politics is to be a benchmark for Indonesian 
democratisation. New Order policy, driven in particular by the technophilic fantasies 
of Habibie during his term as the Minister for technology, developed the Internet as 
Indonesia’s connection to the economic and scientific capitals of the world. It is well-
known that the groundwork for the Indonesian information superhighway was laid by 
a generation of foreign trained technologists who benefited from Habibie’s policies 
and largesse. The same ‘Habibie-whizkids’ who formed the first ISPs also supported 
the semi-underground Internet newsgroups as middle-class discontent peaked. These 
groups were often more connected to the international NGOs, expatriate communities 
living in the west, and professionals all around the world, than to their own hinterland 
of poor, illiterate, and not necessarily liberal masses, whose votes should count in the 
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exercise of any democracy, and whose voices are more present on the regional radio 
waves. Radio, by contrast, is the medium of the rural and the regional not only 
because of its distribution, but because the policies of the New Order precisely made 
radio the repository of local cultural politics. For Indonesia’s fledgling civil society 
institutions radio(inter)activity may remain important for some time yet. 
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